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Abstract In this paper, a nonlinear revision protocol is proposed and embedded into the 
traffic evolution equation of the classical proportional-switch adjustment process (PAP), 
developing the present nonlinear pairwise swapping dynamics (NPSD) to describe the selfish 
rerouting evolutionary game. It is demonstrated that i) NPSD and PAP require the same 
amount of network information acquisition in the route-swaps, ii) NPSD is able to prevent the 
over-swapping deficiency under a plausible behavior description; iii) NPSD can maintain the 
solution invariance, which makes the trial and error process to identify a feasible step-length 
in a NPSD-based swapping algorithm is unnecessary, and iv) NPSD is a rational behavior 
swapping process and the continuous-time NPSD is globally convergent. Using the 
day-to-day NPSD, a numerical example is conducted to explore the effects of the reaction 
sensitivity on traffic evolution and characterize the convergence of discrete-time NPSD.  
 
Keywords Day-to-day traffic assignment, proportional-switch adjustment process, pairwise 
route-swapping, revision protocol, evolutionary stability 
1 Introduction 
Wardrop (1952) formally put forward two route choice principles which later were termed as 
user equilibrium (UE) principle and system optimization (SO) principle. Later, Beckmann et 
al. (1956) created a convex mathematical programming model equivalent to the UE condition, 
stimulating rich advances in the traffic assignment theory (Sheffi 1985; Patriksson 1994; 
Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos 2001; Jin 2014). A central task in the traditional traffic assignment 
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studies is to identify the static (or dynamic) equilibrium states. For the long term traffic 
planning, finding the equilibrium states is important and valuable. However, these studies face 
a reality: the equilibrium state may not be reachable; even if reachable, sufficient time and 
route swaps are needed. Therefore, besides the equilibrium states, traffic assignment should 
still attach importance to model the route-swapping dynamical process (also referred to as 
day-to-day traffic assignment). The day-to-day traffic modeling approach pays more attention 
to the disequilibrium evolution process rather than the final equilibrium state. As mentioned in 
Watling and Hazelton (2003), it has great flexibility which allows a wide range of behavior 
rules, levels of aggregation, and traffic modes to be synthesized into a uniform framework. 
Therefore, the day-to-day traffic modeling approach is viewed as the most appropriate one to 
analyze the traffic equilibrium process (He et al. 2010).  
The day-to-day route-swapping models can be divided into several classes. The 
deterministic models (e.g., the models summarized in Yang and Zhang 2009) and stochastic 
models (Cantarella and Cascetta 1995; Watling 1999; Bie and Lo 2010; Xiao and Lo 2014) 
are classified by the network stochasticity; the path-based models (Yang and Zhang 2009; 
Cantarella and Cascetta 1995; Watling 1999) and link-based models (He et al. 2010; Han and 
Du 2012; He and Liu 2012; Guo et al. 2013; Di et al. 2014) are classified by the carrier of 
traffic evolution. He et al. (2010) pointed out two deficiencies in the path-based models, i.e., 
the path-flow-nonuniqueness problem and the path-overlapping problem. The first deficiency 
is a technical deficiency, which can be resolved by estimating the most likely path flow 
pattern in theory (Bar-Gera 2006) or tracing the traffic flows in practice. The second one is a 
behavioral deficiency. He et al. (2010) argued that this problem was likely to exist generally 
in the deterministic path-based models. Smith and Mounce (2011) proposed a splitting rate 
rerouting model which, however, did not exhibit the anomaly identified by He et al. (2010). 
The splitting rate model is the splitting rate version of the proportional-switch adjustment 
process (PAP) introduced by Smith (1984). Thus, this paper does not intend to address the 
path-overlapping problem but focus on developing a path-based route-swapping process with 
a sounder behavior realism under the pairwise swapping framework. We argue that, from the 
behavioral perspective, a path-based rerouting model is more fundamental in modeling the 
individual route-swapping behaviors since it is the route-swapping rather than link-swapping 
which drives the traffic evolution. According to the focus of this study, here we just present a 
brief review on the deterministic path-based rerouting models.  
Except for the aforementioned PAP (Smith 1984), there are many other deterministic 
path-based rerouting models, for instance, the simplex gravity flow dynamics (Smith 1983), 
the network tatonnement process (Friesz et al. 1994), the projected dynamic system (Zhang 
and Nagurney 1996; Nagurney and Zhang 1997), and the BNN swapping process (Yang 2005). 
Yang and Zhang (2009) proved the five rerouting dynamics are rational behavior adjustment 
processes (RBAP) whose stationary link flows are UE. Among the abovementioned five 
RBAPs, PAP is the most natural and has the simplest formulation. PAP has stimulated various 
extensional applications (e.g., Smith and Wisten 1995; Huang and Lam 2002; Peeta and Yang 
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2003; Yang et al. 2007; Mounce and Carey 2011; Smith and Mounce 2011, etc.). Based on 
PAP, Cho and Hwang (2005a, 2005b) proposed a stimulus-reaction dynamic model. Li et al. 
(2012) developed an excess-travel-cost PAP. From a new perspective, Jin (2007) proposed a 
J-dynamic model whose stationary state was not equivalent to UE. Therefore, the J-dynamic 
model is not a RBAP. Considering that RBAP has been viewed as a basic behavior rule to 
model the rerouting behavior, this study only discusses the RBAP-based models.  
PAP is initially developed to analyze the stability of UE. The essence of PAP is the traffic 
evolution equation, where a linear revision protocol is embedded to model the individual 
rerouting mechanism. The traffic evolution equation of PAP can provide a good behavior 
approximation for the Markov evolution games, and the majority of the existing population 
evolution dynamics can be rewritten in the PAP form with a suitable revision protocol 
(Hofbauer 2011 and Sandholm 2011). However, PAP’s revision protocol assumes the travelers 
adjust their routes day after day in a linear pairwise way; this does not quite accord with the 
fact that human’s behaviors are more likely to be nonlinear. In order to capture the rerouting 
behaviors better, this paper proposes a nonlinear revision protocol and embeds it into the 
traffic evolution equation of PAP, deriving the present nonlinear pairwise swapping dynamics 
(NPSD). NPSD can not only provide a plausible description for travelers’ rerouting behaviors 
but also add a new algorithmic device to solve the traffic equilibrium.  
The remaining context is organized as follows. In Section 2, PAP is given and analyzed. 
Section 3 elaborates on the proposed NPSD model. Section 4 discusses the stability of NPSD. 
Applying the day-to-day NPSD, a numerical example is performed in Section 5 to explore the 
impacts of reaction sensitivity on the network traffic evolution and stability of discrete-time 
NPSD (DNPSD). Section 6 concludes the whole study and suggests some future works.  
2 PAP 
The continuous-time PAP (CPAP), firstly proposed by Smith (1984), is formulated as follows:  
  , , ,
w w
wt wt wt wt wt w
k p pk k kp
p K p K
f f f k K w W t T 
 
         (1) 
where  
  max 0, .wt wt wtkp k pC C     (2) 
Here, T  is the terminal time of swapping, t  is the time index, W  is the set of OD-pairs, 
w  is the OD-pair index, p  and k  are the route indices, wK  is the set of effective routes 
between OD-pair w , wtkf  is the flow on route k  between OD-pair w  at time t , 
wt
kf  is 
the derivative of wtkf  with respect to t , 
wt
kC  is the cost on route k   between w  at time 
t ,   is a small positive constant, and 
wt
kp  is the revision protocol to estimate the 
proportion of flow that swaps from k  to p  between w  at time t .  
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Eq. (1) is the traffic evolution equation which reflects a fact that the change of traffic flow 
on a route equals to the total flow swapping onto that route minus the total flow swapping off 
it. On the right side of Eq. (1), the first expression formulates the total flow swapping onto 
route k  and the second one formulates the total flow swapping off it. Replacing wtkf  by 
( 1)w t wt
k kf f
   in Eq. (1), the discrete-time PAP (DPAP) is derived.  
According to Eq. (2), we can conclude 0wtkp   and further  
 
 
0                           if  
  , , , .
0  if  
wt wt
k pwt w
kp wt wt wt wt
k p k p
C C
k p K w t
C C C C


 
 
   
  (3) 
Eq. (3) implies that i) traffic only swaps from a costly route to the less costly ones in the same 
OD-pair, and ii) the swapping ratio is proportional to the absolute cost difference between two 
routes. Obviously, 1 , , ,wtkp k p w t    is required; otherwise, an illogical consequence named 
over-swapping will happen and the negative route flows can be produced. The definition of 
over-swapping is given below.  
Definition 1 (Over-swapping). During a route-swapping, the total flow swapping off a route 
is larger than the initial flow on it, mathematically, it means that there exists at least a , ,k w t  
to make 1wtkpp   .  
Generally, a small   is beneficial to prevent over-swapping. Smith and Wisten (1995) 
presented an upper bound of such a small   that can avoid over-swapping, i.e.,  
1
BM

 , 
where  max , ,wt wkB C k K w W t T     and M  is the number of effective routes in the 
network. Obviously, this upper bound does not take much behavior realism into account; it is 
more like a mathematical construction. In the swapping algorithms (e.g., Nie 2003), several 
trial and error techniques (e.g., backtracking, Armijo search, etc.) are employed to indentify 
an appropriate   in each iteration.  
He et al. (2010) gave another expression for   in PAP, i.e.,  
 
 
1
.
max 0, wt wtp kp k C C H
 
  
  (4) 
Here, 0H   is a reluctance parameter, and more travelers prefer maintaining the previous 
choices when a larger H  appears. Mathematically, over-swapping can be prevented by the 
  in Eq. (4). However, this formulation is still unable to provide a satisfactory behavior 
explanation. For instance, the denominator of Eq. (4) implies that the swapping proportion of 
a certain route to its candidate also depends on the pairwise cost differences excluding this 
route. To describe the problem more clearly, we introduce the following example network (see 
Fig. 1), and assume, in the beginning, that i) there is traffic on every route, and ii) Route 1 is 
the most costly, next are Route 2, Route 3 and Route 4, respectively.  
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Fig. 1 The example network 
 
According to the PAP with   formulated by Eq. (4), traffic can swap from Route 1 to 
Route 3, and the swapping ratio also depends on the pairwise cost differences of irrelative 
routes, e.g., Route 2 and Route 4. Obviously, it is unreasonable.  
 It is known from above analysis that a good revision protocol for PAP should not only 
prevent the over-swapping but also possess a plausible behavior description. To this end, this 
paper suggests a new revision protocol and embeds it into the traffic flow evolution equation 
of PAP, deriving the present NPSD model.  
3 Nonlinear pairwise route-swapping dynamics 
Firstly, we present four assumptions for the present route-swapping dynamic model. These 
assumptions are also applied in PAP (Smith 1984).  
1) A traveler only changes his route to a less costly one, and, at least some travelers, if not 
all, will do so unless all the travelers were all on the least cost routes the previous day. 
2) The travel demand is inelastic. 
3) Every driver has perfect information on the previous and current traffic network. 
4) Swap decision is based on the travel experience of the previous day. 
Based on the above four assumptions, the continuous-time NPSD (CNPSD) comprises an 
evolution equation, a nonlinear revision protocol and a feasible initial condition which are 
formulated by Eq. (1), Eq. (5) and Eq. (7), respectively. Replacing wtkf  by 
( 1)w t wt
k kf f
   in 
Eq. (1), the discrete-time NPSD (DNPSD) is derived.  
 
   1max 0, 1 exp , if  
 , , ,
0,                                                                  if 
w wt wt wt
k p kwt wt
kp k
wt
k
C C R
k p w tR
R


  
           


  (5) 
with  
    , ,wt w wt wtk p kR p K C C k w t      (6) 
and the initial route flows satisfy 
 0 0 ;  0 , .w w wk kk f d w f k w      (7) 
Here, wtkR  is the set of candidate routes for route k  between OD-pair w  at time t , 
wt
kR  
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is the number of routes in wt
kR , 
wd  is the travel demand between w , w  is a positive 
constant that reflects the travelers’ reaction sensitivity between w , and the travelers react 
more sensitively as w  increases.  
The revision protocol wtkp  in Eq. (5) is used to estimate the proportion of traffic flow 
swapping from route k  to its candidates. Actually, we can also interpret the meaning of the 
revision protocol from a microscopic perspective, i.e., the possibility for a person swapping 
from a route to another at a time. When the amount of route flow is large enough, the two 
meanings can be unified according to the weak law of large numbers. Eq. (6) shows that the 
candidates of route k  should belong to the same OD-pair with route k  and have a strictly 
lower travel cost. In Eq. (7), the first equation is the equilibrium constraint of travel demand; 
the second one promises the path flows are nonnegative. Usually, a defined constraint for the 
path and link flows is also introduced, i.e.,  ,t wt wa k akw kv f a t   , where 
t
av  is the flow 
on link a  at day t , and 0-1 indicator 1wak   if link a  is used by the route k  between 
w ; otherwise, 0wak  .  
Next, we elaborate on the behavior mechanism of the second expression on the right hand 
of Eq. (5) when wtkR  . To simplify the elaboration, we interpret it from a microscopic 
perspective. When wtkR  ,   1 exp w wt wtk pC C    can be considered to formulate the 
monopolized probability of a driver swaps from route k  to p  given that p  is the unique 
candidate of route k . When the candidate routes are not unique, a person needs to distribute 
the probability on the candidates properly since one cannot choose all the candidate routes 
simultaneously. Here 
1
wt
kR

 is designed to formulate the distributing mechanism of these 
monopolized probabilities; it implies that a person will reassign the monopolized probability 
towards each candidate by dividing the number of candidates.  
Although we have assumed in prior that the network information is perfect, actually only 
the information of being-used route and the candidates is needed for the NPSD process, which 
means that NPSD does not increase the network information acquisition than PAP. Next, we 
state three important properties of NPSD.  
Property 1 (contrary sign). For NPSD (In the remaining context, a property or a theorem that 
holds for NPSD means it holds for both CNPSD and DNPSD), the following inequality holds 
in general, i.e.,  
   0 , , ,wt wt wtkp k pC C k p w t      (8) 
Proof. According to Eqs. (5)-(6), it can be concluded that 0
wt
kp   if and only if 
wt wt
k pC C  
and 0wtkp   if and only if 
wt wt
k pC C . Then, we have   0wt wt wtkp k pC C   . □ 
Property 2 (non-over-swapping). For NPSD, during a swapping, the total flow swapping off 
a route cannot spill its initial value, mathematically, i.e.,  
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 0 1 , , .wtkpp k w t     (9) 
Proof. Since   1 exp 1w wt wtk pC C    , then    0 max 0, 1 exp 1w wt wtk pC C      
and    
-1
max 0, 1 expw wt
k
wt wt wt w wt wt
kp kp k k pp p K p R
R C C  
 
        further, which is 
less than 
-1
1 1wt
k
wt
kp R
R

   if wtkR   and equals to 0 otherwise. Recall 0
wt
kp  , we 
have 0wtkpp   , then Property 2 holds. □ 
Property 3 (solution invariance). For NPSD, if the initial path flow pattern is feasible, so are 
the remaining path flow patterns.  
Proof. Given a feasible initial route flow pattern, Property 3 requires that the remaining route 
flows are nonnegative and the travel demands are conservative, i.e.,  
  ;  0 , , .wt w wtk kk f d w f k w t      (10) 
Eq. (10) is the feasible route flow set  . Define a small real number 0  , firstly, we prove 
that CNPSD possesses Property 3.  
Non-negativity. According to Eq. (5) and Property 2, 0wtkp   and 1
wt
kpp
   are 
guaranteed. Recall Eq. (1), we have ( ) 0w t wt wt wt wt wt wtk k p pk k p pkp pf f f f f
          if 
0 ,wtkf k w  . In other words, 
( ) 0w tkf
   if 0 , ,wtkf k w t  . By recurrence, it can be 
concluded that 0 , ,wtkf k w t   if 
0 0 ,wkf k w  .  
Conservation. Since 
  , ,wt wt wt wt wt wtp pk k kp k kpk p p k k pf f f w t           
according to Eq. (1), we have 
( )
0               0 .
w t wt wt wt wt wt
k k p pk k kp
k k k p p
wt w w
k kk k
f f f f
f f d
  
 
   
 
    
    
 
 
For the above proof, let   and t  take integers, the solution invariance will hold for 
DNPSD. Accordingly, Property 3 is proved. □ 
Property 3 is significant for developing a NPSD-based swapping algorithm to solve the 
traffic equilibrium problem. It means that the trial and error process for a feasible step-length 
can be omitted in a NPSD-based swapping algorithm, which helps to raise the efficiency of a 
swapping algorithm.  
Definition 2 (Wardrop user equilibrium (Wardrop 1952)). At the equilibrium state, all the 
used paths between the same OD-pair have the minimal and equal travel costs when the travel 
demand is fixed. Mathematically, the following expression holds at time t .  
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   if   0
  , ,
   if   0
w wt
kwt
k w wt
k
f
C k w
f


 

 
  (11) 
where w  is the minimum route cost between OD-pair w  at time t .  
Definition 3 (stationary path flow pattern). The stationary path flow pattern of NPSD is a set 
of network path flow states; starting from these path flow states, NPSD reproduces them.  
Corollary 1. For NPSD, tf  (groups  ,wtkf k w ) belongs to the stationary path flow pattern  
if and only if ( 1)0 (or  ) ,wt w t wtk k kf f f k w
   .  
Proof. Since NPSD is a determined one-to-one dynamics (i.e., a determined input produces a 
single determined output), the necessity of Corollary 1 can be easily proved by recurrence. 
The sufficiency can be concluded by Definition 3. □ 
Subsequently, we present the equivalent relationship between stationary path flow pattern 
of NPSD and Wardrop user equilibrium.  
Theorem 1. The stationary path flow pattern of NPSD is equivalent to Wardrop user 
equilibrium. 
Proof. Firstly, we prove that Theorem 1 holds for CNPSD. For this, based on Corollary 1, we 
only need to prove that tf  with 0 ,wtkf k w   is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium.  
Sufficiency. Suppose route k  has the minimum cost among the routes between w  (i.e., 
 wt wt wk pC C p K    and 0
wt
kf  ), 0 
wt w
kp p K     is promised. According to Eq. (1), we 
have 0 ,wt wtp pkp f k w    if 0 ,
wt
kf k w  . Since 
wt
pk  and 
wt
kf  are both non-negative 
further, 0 ,wt wtp pkf k w    can be deduced. Note that 0 ,
wt wt
p pkf k w    implies 
wt wt
k pC C  
 0wtpf   and 
wt wt
k pC C  if 0
wt
pf  . Denote 
w wt
kC  , it means that 
wt w
pC   if 
0wtpf   and 
wt w
pC   if 0
wt
pf  , which is exactly the Wardrop user equilibrium.  
Necessity. Suppose tf  is a Wardrop user equilibrium, i.e., wt wkC   if 0
wt
kf   and 
wt w
kC   if 0
wt
kf  , we have  
wt wt w
k pC C p K    if 0
wt
kf   and 
wt wt
k pC C  if 0
wt
kf   
and 0wtpf  . From Eq. (5), 0 
wt w
kp p K     if 0
wt
kf   and 0 
wt w
pk p K     if 0
wt
kf   
and 0wtpf   are promised. Then we have 0 ,
wt wt
k kpp
f k w    and 0 ,wt wtp pkp f k w    
if 0wtkf  , which leads to 0 ,
wt
kf k w   if 0
wt
kf   from Eq. (1). When 0
wt
kf  , we have 
0 ,wt wtk kppf k w   , and 0 
wt w
pk p K     if 0
wt
pf  , then 0 ,
wt wt
p pkp
f k w    can be 
also derived. Recall Eq. (1) again, we can conclude 0 ,wtkf k w   if 0
wt
kf  . Therefore, 
t
f  with 0 ,wtkf k w   is at Wardrop user equilibrium.  
Accordingly, Theorem 1 holds for CNPSD. Replacing wtkf  by 
( 1)w t wt
k kf f
   above, we 
obtain the proof for DNPSD. □ 
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Definition 4 (rational behavior adjustment process, RBAP (Yang and Zhang 2009)). A 
day-to-day route choice adjustment process is called a RBAP with fixed travel demand if the 
aggregated travel cost of the entire network decreases based on the previous day’s path travel 
costs when path flows change from day to day. Moreover, if the path flows become stationary 
over days, then it is equivalent to the user equilibrium path flow.  
Theorem 2. NPSD is a RBAP.  
Proof. Firstly, we prove CNPSD is a RBAP. Based on Theorem 1, to prove Theorem 2, we 
only need to prove 0wt wtk kw k C f   . For this, expanding 
wt wt
k kw k
C f   as follows: 
 
                    
                    
                 
wt wt wt wt wt wt wt
k k k p pk k kp
w k w k p p
wt wt wt wt wt wt
k p pk k k kp
w k p w k p
wt wt wt wt wt wt
k p pk k k kp
w k p w k p
C f C f f
C f C f
C f C f
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
    
   
 
   
   
 
 
   
                    
                    .
wt wt wt wt wt wt
k p pk p p pk
w k p w p k
wt wt wt wt wt wt
k p pk p p pk
w k p w k p
wt wt wt wt
k p p pk
w k p
C f C f
C f C f
C C f
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

  (12) 
Recall Property 1, we have   0wt wt wt wtk p p pkw k p C C f     . Hence, CNPSD is a 
RBAP. Replacing wtkf  by 
( 1)w t wt
k kf f
   above, we obtain the proof for DNPSD. □ 
Corollary 2. The stationary link flow pattern of NPSD is equivalent to Wardrop user 
equilibrium. 
Proof. Zhang et al. (2001) had proved the stationary link flow pattern of RBAP is equivalent 
to Wardrop user equilibrium. According to Theorem 2, Corollary 2 holds. □ 
As is known to all, without extra behavioral conditions, Wardrop user equilibrium is not 
unique for path flow solution but only for link flow solution. However, according to Theorem 
2 and Corollary 2, we can judge whether DNPSD has arrived at equilibrium by detecting the 
link flow states.  
4 Lyapunov stability 
Lyapunov method is an acknowledged methodology to analyze the stability of a dynamic 
system (Khalil 2002). The essence of this method is to identify a proper Lyapunov function. 
Peeta and Yang (2003) introduced the following Lyapunov function to analyze the stability of 
continuous-time PAP, namely 
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0
( ) ( ) ,V d 
Δf
f c y y   (13) 
where Δ  is the path link incidence matrix, the column vector f  groups all the path flows 
and the row vector ( )c  groups the link travel times.  
 In this study, we still employ the above Lyapunov function to analyze the stability of the 
present CNPSD model.  
Theorem 3. All the solutions of CNPSD are bounded and converge to Wardrop user 
equilibrium.  
Proof. Since ( )c  is non-negative and ( )V f  if f , then ( )V f  is non-negative and 
radially unbounded. According to Eq. (12), take the derivative of ( )V f  with respect to t , to 
give ( ) ( ) 0wt wtk kw kV V C f
     f f Δf cΔf Cf , where the row vector C  groups all 
the route costs. Let  ( ) 0Z V f f  and E  be the largest invariant set contained in the set 
Z , according to LaSalle’s theorem (Khalil 2002), all the solutions of CNPSD model will be 
bounded and converge to the set E . Then, to prove Theorem 3, we only need to prove that 
the set E  is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium. 
Since  ( ) 0wt wt wt wt wt wtk k k p p pkw k w k pV C f C C f        f , we have ( ) 0V f  if 
and only if 
   0 , , .wt wt wt wtk p p pkC C f k p w     (14) 
According to Eq. (14), we have wt wtp kC C  if 0
wt
pf  . Hence, given 0
wt
pf   and 0
wt
kf  , 
we have wt wtp kC C , which means that those used paths have smaller costs than those unused; 
again, given 0wtpf   and 0
wt
kf  , we have 
wt wt
p kC C  and 
wt wt
p kC C , forcing 
wt wt
p kC C , 
which means that the used paths have the same cost. In summary, Eq. (14) implies that the 
used paths have the same cost, and this cost is smaller than the costs of the unused paths. Thus, 
Z  is exactly equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium. From Property 3, the invariant set of 
CNPSD model is the feasible set   itself (defined in Eq. (10)). Thus, the largest invariant 
set E Z Z  . Then Theorem 3 is proved. □  
 Theorem 3 promises the convergence of CNPSD. However, we cannot conclude DNPSD 
is convergent from it. For DNPSD, we will examine the convergence through the numerical 
example conducted in Section 5.  
5 Numerical example 
In this section, using the day-to-day NPSD, we perform some numerical sensitivity analyses 
on an example network to interpret the impacts of reaction sensitivity on the traffic evolution 
and convergent characteristic of DNPSD. To this end, various levels of one-day capacity 
reductions are imposed on the example traffic network.  
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5.1 Example network and scenarios 
The example network (see Fig. 2) has 12 nodes, 17 links, 2 OD-pairs and 8 paths, where 
OD-pair (1, 11) is connected by Path 1 ( 1 9 14  ), Path 2 ( 1 5 10  ), Path 3 
( 2 6 10  ) and Path 4 ( 2 11 15  ); OD-pair (2, 12) is connected by Path 5 
(3 11 16  ), Path 6 ( 3 7 12  ), Path 7 ( 4 8 12  ) and Path 8 ( 4 13 17  ).  
The travel demands for two OD-pairs are 90 (pcu/min). In Fig. 2, the bracketed three 
numbers in each link are the label, free-flow time (min) and normal capacity (pcu/min) of that 
link, respectively. The travel time of each link is computed by the BPR function 
 
4
0 1 0.15  , ,
t
t a
a a
a
v
c c a t
O
  
    
   
  (15) 
where 0ac , and aO  are the free-flow time and initial capacity of link a , respectively. For 
brevity, we will omit the units in the remaining context. 
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Fig. 2 The example network 
 
It can be concluded from Fig. 2 that the flows on Routes 1~4 respectively equal to that of 
Routes 8~5 when Fig. 2 is symmetric. This property will be often quoted below. Given that 
1.0 10s E  , the initial traffic flow pattern of the network is at UE state with 
0 (20,20,25,25,25,25,20,20)Tf , and all travelers have the same reaction sensitivity  ; let 
vector ( 9, 11)Cap CapCap , where 9Cap  and 11Cap  are the reduction percentages of 
capacity on link 9 and link 11, respectively. In this numerical example, we design two 
scenarios which are parameterized as follows.  
Asymmetric capacity reduction (ACR):  
([0.1:0.1:0.9],0)Cap  when [0.01:0.01:0.3]  . 
Symmetric capacity reduction (SCR):  
(0,[0.1:0.1:0.9])Cap  when [0.01:0.01:0.3]  . 
Note that the capacity reduces just at day 0 and reverts to normal after day 0. Also, only 
one link suffers from the capacity reduction at each time. Obviously, Fig. 2 remains 
symmetric under SCR, but becomes asymmetric under ACR. Here the convergence criterion 
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is set to be 1 1.0 005n n E   f f .  
5.2 Numerical results 
Fig. 3 displays the traffic evolution processes under medium SCRs with (0,50%)Cap . For 
simplicity and without loss of generality, we just draw the results when [0.05:0.05:0.3]  . 
Fig. 3 indicates the traffic evolutions on the symmetric routes are identical under all SCRs. It 
also indicates the traffic flows on the directly interfered routes (i.e., Route 4 and 5) face heavy 
flow losses, causing the sudden flow drops in the curves on the next day. In addition, when 
[0.05:0.05:0.2]  , the route-swaps are convergent, whereas the smoothness of route-swaps 
becomes worse as   rises. When [0.25:0.05:0.3]  , the route-swaps fail to converge but 
finally reach the 2-day-cycled oscillations or quasi-oscillations, and the oscillation amplitudes 
increase as   rises.  
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Fig. 3 Traffic evolutions under different one-day medium SCRs 
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The detail numerical results show that if the route-swap is not able to converge, it will 
finally fall into 2-day-cycled oscillations or quasi-oscillations. To measure the final oscillation 
degrees, below we introduce the average deviation (AD) index, i.e.,  
  
1 2
2000
2
0
1999
1
,
2
wt w
k k
t w k
AD f f

 
  
 
    (16) 
where the number 2 in the denominator is the cycle of periodical (or quasi-periodical) 
oscillation. Since the route-swaps finally reach periodical (or quasi-periodical) oscillations 
within 100 days, here we draw the two path flow samples at iteration of 1999 and 2000. Of 
course, any two adjacent path flow samples after 100 days are effective. Obviously, AD is 
strictly positive if route-swaps are not convergent and 0 otherwise. In addition, AD increases 
when the oscillation becomes more severe. Subsequently, we present the ADs under two 
numerical scenarios.  
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Fig. 4 Final ADs under different ( , ) Cap  
 
Two sub-figures in Fig. 4 jointly shows that: 1) ADs are 0 when [0.01:0.01:0.21]   
and then become larger than 0 and increase as   increases in [0.22:0.01:0.3]  ; 2) for a 
specific  , ADs under different capacity reductions have few differences except the one 
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when 0   and (0,0.1)Cap . It demonstrates that the stability of DNPSD does not hold 
in general but influenced by the reaction sensitivity and capacity reduction; moreover, it 
depends much more on   rather than the capacity reduction. Also, we can classify the final 
flow states into three phases, i.e., the stable phase with [0.01:0.01:0.21]  , the meta-stable 
phase with 0.22   and the unstable phase with [0.23:0.01:0.3]  . For the stable phase, 
the route-swaps can converge to the initial UE state for all capacity reductions; for the meta- 
stable phase, the route-swaps either converge or fall into 2-day-cycled quasi-oscillations in the 
end; for the unstable phase, the route-swaps finally fall into 2-day-cycled oscillations or 
quasi-oscillations.  
Fig. 5 displays the impacts of capacity reduction Cap  and reaction sensitivity   on 
the convergent rate of route-swaps conducted by the day-to-day NPSD in the stable phase 
with [0.01:0.01:0.21]  .  
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Fig. 5 Convergence under different ( , ) Cap  
 
Fig. 5 suggests that, for a specific capacity reduction, the convergence rate increases at 
first and then decreases as   increases from 0.01 to 0.3; for a given  , the convergence rate 
increases on the whole as the capacity reduction increases, but this trend weakens as   
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increases. Overall, the reaction sensitivity   has more significant effect on the convergent 
rate of route-swap than the capacity reduction Cap . The above findings can provide some 
useful insights for developing a NPSD-based swapping algorithm. Due to the value of   
cannot impact the feasibility of path flow solutions, we can maintain   at a relative small 
(rather than a very small) level to realize a faster convergence. However, it should be noted 
that such a relative small   may vary for different networks.  
6 Conclusions and future researches 
6.1 Research conclusions 
In this paper, under the pairwise route-swapping behavioral framework, a nonlinear revision 
protocol is proposed and embedded into the traffic evolution equation of PAP, developing the 
present NPSD model. It is demonstrated that i) NPSD and PAP require the same amount of 
network information acquisition in route-swapping, ii) NPSD can prevent the over-swapping 
deficiency under a plausible behavior description, iii) NPSD can keep solution invariance, 
which means that the trial and error process for a feasible step-length can be omitted in a 
NPSD-based swapping algorithm and it helps raise the efficiency of algorithm, and iv) NPSD 
is a rational behavior swapping process and the CNPSD is globally convergent.  
Using the day-to-day NPSD, a numerical example is conducted to explore the effects of 
the reaction sensitivity on traffic evolution and the convergence characteristics of DNPSD. 
The following numerical results are found.  
1) The final flow states can be divided into three phases, i.e., the stable phase, the 
meta-stable phase and the unstable phase. For the stable phase, route-swaps converge 
to UE under all designed capacity reductions; for the meta-stable phase, route-swaps 
either converge or fall into 2-day-cycled quasi-oscillations in the end; for the 
unstable phase, route-swaps finally fall into the 2-day-cycled oscillations or 
quasi-oscillations.  
2) The reaction sensitivity   has significant effect on the stability of DNPSD and the 
traffic evolution, while the capacity reduction takes a much smaller effect.  
3) For DNPSD, there is a relative optimal interval associated with reaction sensitivity 
  to realize a faster convergence.  
6.2 Future researches 
It should be noted that the numerical results stated in Section 6.1 are only applicable for the 
example network. Whether these results apply to the other ones needs to be investigated more 
exhaustively. Many further works are worthy of exploring based on NPSD.  
1) From the behavioral aspect, empirical studies need to be performed to calculate   
and to understand the travelers’ route-swapping behaviors better.  
2) From the algorithmic aspect, i) the NPSD-based swapping algorithm deserves to be 
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developed (e.g., Zhang et al. 2014), compared with the other algorithms (e.g., Frank 
and Wolfe 1956; Huang and Lam 2002; Nie 2003; Patriksson 2004, etc.), and tested 
on the practical or large networks, and ii) a general stability theory for DNPSD needs 
to be developed.  
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